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Randomize-hash-then-sign signatures
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Randomized hashing (Halevi and Krawczyk-Crypto’06)
Hr (m) = H((m1 ⊕ r)‖(m2 ⊕ r)‖ . . . ‖(mt ⊕ r)) where H is an n-bit
hash function.
m1 m2 m3 mt
r rrr
f f ff HtH0
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Properties
Target collision resistance (TCR): Difficulty in finding
m∗ 6= m after committing to m and receiving r , such that
Hr (m) = Hr (m∗).
If f is c-SPR or e-SPR then Hr is TCR.
Signing using Hr :
Use SIG algorithm to sign the pair (r , Hr (m)).
Certain signature schemes either do not accommodate
signing of both r and Hr (m) (DSA) or requires
implementation changes (RSA).
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RMX Hash function mode
H˜r (m) = H(r‖(m1 ⊕ r)‖(m2 ⊕ r)‖ . . . ‖(mt ⊕ r))
m1 m2 m3 mt
rr rrr
f ff ff HtH0
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Properties
Enhanced target collision resistance (eTCR): Difficulty in
finding (r∗, m∗) 6= (r , m) after committing to m and
receiving r , such that H˜r (m) = H˜r∗(m∗).
If f is c-SPR or e-SPR then H˜r is eTCR
Signing using H˜r :
Use SIG algorithm to sign just H˜r (m)
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Known results on randomize-hash-then-sign schemes
Forging signatures based on Hr and H˜r (via off-line) requires:
Solving a cryptanalytical problem which is related to finding
second preimages in H.
Kelsey-Schneier second preimage attack on H for a
message of 2k blocks in 2n−k work.
Breaking c-SPR or e-SPR property of f .
To forge randomize-hash-then-sign signatures:
How many queries to the signer are required?
What properties of f or H can we exploit?
For how many times we need to play the game of
TCR/eTCR?
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Generic forgery of RMX-hash-then-sign schemes
(Dang-Perlner)
1. mi
2. ri , si
3. H˜ri (mi) = hi and store (mi , hi , ri , si ) in L1
i = 1, . . . , 2n/2
Attacker Signer
4. Choose some r∗, do H˜r∗(m∗i ) = h∗i and store (h∗i , m∗i ) in L2.
5. Find (r , m) ∈ L1 and m∗ ∈ L2 such that H˜r (m) = H˜r∗(m∗).
6. Signature on m is also valid on m∗.
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Limitations
Attack does not succeed when:
Same salt r is used for both hashing and signing (DSA,
ECDSA, RSA-PSS).
Signatures are based on TCR hashing Hr .
We can overcome these limitations when f has fixed points.
Davies-Meyer compression function used in many popular
hashes such as MD5 and SHA family has this property.
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Forging H-SIG scheme using Dean’s method
Exploit the fixed point property of Davies-Meyer.
1 Find 2n/2 hash values of H for equal length messages mi .
Store (Hi , mi) in L1.
2 Find 2n/2 fixed points (Hi , m∗i ) for f . Store them in L2.
3 Find (Hx , m) ∈ L1 and (Hx , m∗) ∈ L2 such that
H(m) = Hx = f (Hx , m∗).
4 H(m) = H(m‖m∗) ⇒ SIG(H(m)) = SIG(H(m‖m∗)).
EH0
m
H Hx HxHx
m∗ = m′‖pad
0
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Forging RMX-hash-then-sign schemes
On-line phase:
Ask the signer for the signatures si on 2n/2 equal length
messages mi . Store (ri , mi , si) in L1.
1. mi
2. si , riAttacker Signer
Note that si = SIG(H˜ri (mi)) and i = 1, . . . , 2n/2.
Off-line phase: Compute H˜ri (mi) and add to L1.
Gauravaram and Knudsen Randomize-hash-then-sign schemes 15/ 22
Strengthening digital signatures via randomized hashing
Generic forgery attack on RMX-hash-then-sign schemes
Forging some randomize-hash-then-sign schemes
Forging RMX-hash-then-sign schemes
Off-line phase:
Compute 2n/2 fixed points (Hi , Ni) for f . Store them in L2.
E
Ni = N ′i ‖padf
Hi Hi0
i = 1, . . . , 2n/2
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Off-line phase:
1 Find (m, r , H˜r (m)) ∈ L1 and (N, H˜r (N)) ∈ L2 such that
H˜r (m) = Hx = f (Hx , N).
2 This implies H˜r (m) = Hx = H˜r (m‖m∗) where m∗ = N ⊕ r .
3 SIG(H˜r (m)) = SIG(H˜r (m‖m∗)).
4 Output m‖m∗ as the forgery of m.
Complexity: 2n/2 chosen messages, 2n/2+1 evaluations of f and
2n/2 memory
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Forging RMX-hash-then-sign schemes
RMX
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Applications of the approach
Independent of the size of r .
RMX-hash-then-sign scheme in NIST’s SP 800-106.
Applies to signatures based on Hr (m), H(r‖Hr (m)) and
RO(Hr (m)).
Many others (please see article).
n-bit hash with at least 2n-bit intermediate state thwarts the
attack as in many SHA-3 candidates.
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Summary of our analysis
1 Complements previous analysis:
Off-line birthday attacks do not help.
Attacks must be online but not much over birthday
complexity.
Worth investigating SPR properties of compression
functions in the SHA-3 competition.
2 Security of RMX-hash-then-sign schemes is similar to that
of HMAC.
Nitpick in Conclusion: “Our research shows that randomized
hashing is not easy to implement safely.”
One may have to be careful while choosing the same salt for
both hashing and signing. Further research is required.
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